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Courts determine the enforceability of covenants not to compete
by applying the centuries-old common-law prohibition against unrea-
sonable restraints of trade.' The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
declares that a promise to refrain from competition is an unreasonable
restraint of trade, and thus is unenforceable, if the promise "is not
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship." 2 This
principle recognizes that thwarting competition is not a legitimate end
in itself. To merit judicial approval, a restraint of competition merely
must serve as the means of attaining some lawful aim, such as protect-
ing the value of good will acquired in connection with the purchase of
an ongoing business, or safeguarding trade secrets and confidential
customer information entrusted to an employee. 3
The Restatement lists three examples of ancillary covenants not
to compete:
(a) a promise by the seller of a business not to compete with
the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the business sold;
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete
with his employer or other principal;
(c) a promise by a partner not to compete with the
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. A.B., College
of William and Mary, 1973; M. Litt., Oxford University, 1975; J.D., Harvard University, 1978.
Portions of this article are based on an opinion the author wrote as special chancellor in
Swink & Co. v. Bowman & Co., Nos. 87-271 and 272 (Pulaski Co. Chan. Ct., 3d Div., May 18,
1987). The opinion, and therefore this article, benefited greatly from the labors of the talented
counsel in that case: Mark Nichols, Elizabeth Robben, Robert Fuller, Stephen Rowell, Collins
Kilgore, Mark Allison, William Waddell, and Pat James.
1. See generally 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 366-69 (1986). The best historical ac-
count of the common-law rule forbidding unreasonable restraints of trade is the opinion by
Circuit Judge (later President and Chief Justice) William Howard Taft in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-91 (6th Cir. 1898), modified as to decree and aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 (1981). See generally Handler &
Larazoff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
669 (1982) (discussing background of Restatement rules).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comments b, f, & g.
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partnership.'
Even an ancillary covenant is unenforceable, however, if it violates the
rule of reason. Under the rule, a court will refuse to uphold a cove-
nant if it proscribes more activities, covers more territory, or lasts
longer than necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests, or
if the promisee's need for protection is outweighed by the hardship to
the promisor and the likely injury to the public.'
These doctrines have produced a huge body of case law and
scholarly commentary.6 The purpose of this article is to examine the
way Arkansas courts have applied the doctrines to the two most com-
mon kinds of covenants not to compete: a seller's promise not to
compete with the buyer following the sale of a business or professional
practice; and an employee's promise not to compete with his em-
ployer after leaving the job.7
Section II of the article discusses the ends/means analytical
framework judges use when deciding whether to enforce a covenant
not to compete. Section III describes the various ancillary purposes
that Arkansas courts deem sufficiently legitimate to warrant enforce-
ment of a reasonably circumscribed covenant. Section IV explores
Arkansas courts' utilization of means scrutiny to uncover illegitimate
anticompetitive objectives concealed behind ostensibly valid purposes.
The Conclusion suggests a few guidelines for drafting covenants
which will pass muster under Arkansas law.
II. ENDS/MEANS ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The common-law methodology courts use to determine the en-
forceability of covenants not to compete resembles the ends/means
analysis they employ in constitutional cases. Just as ends/means
scrutiny helps courts "flush out" illicit purposes in equal protection
cases,8 ends/means analysis assists courts in identifying those cove-
4. Id. § 188.
5. See id. comments a & d.
6. See generally A. VALIULIS, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: FORMS, TACTICS, AND
THE LAW (1985); Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960);
Comment, Covenants Not to Compete in Tennessee Employment Contracts: Almost Everything
You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask, 55 TENN. L. REV. 341 (1988) (citing numerous
scholarly articles).
7. The third type of covenant mentioned by the Restatement-a promise by a partner not
to compete with the partnership-will not be examined separately because such covenants are
treated much the same as employee covenants. See A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.3, at
338 (1982).
8. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146
(1980).
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nants that have as their principal aim the suppression of ordinary
competition rather than protection of a legitimate interest.
To ascertain whether a particular covenant is enforceable be-
cause it reasonably restrains unfair competition, or unenforceable be-
cause it unreasonably restricts ordinary competition, a court must ask
several questions:
1. Does the covenant ostensibly have a legitimate purpose, or is
it a naked restraint of competition? If the covenant does not even
purport to do something other than aid the promisee in his quest to
monopolize the market, the court will not enforce it. If it appears to
serve a legitimate function, however, the court will go to the next
question.
2. Is the ostensible purpose the real purpose, or is it a smoke
screen for an attempt to monopolize? The court will answer this
query by examining how closely the means fit the purported ends. If
the connection is close enough, the court will conclude that the cove-
nant really is a reasonable restriction on unfair competition and de-
serves enforcement. If the nexus appears too attenuated, though, the
court will decide that the covenant's real goal is to impose an unrea-
sonable restraint on ordinary competition, which public policy
forbids.
In the case of a covenant ancillary to the sale of a business, the
court will not demand a very close fit, but if the provision limits em-
ployment opportunities, the court must precisely measure the gap be-
tween means and ends9 by paying careful attention to the answers to
the next three subquestions:
9. Arkansas courts frankly acknowledge the existence of this double standard of review.
They apply heightened scrutiny to employment restrictions and minimal scrutiny to covenants
ancillary to the sale of a business. See Hyde v. CM Vending Co., 288 Ark. 218, 222, 703
S.W.2d 862, 864 (1986); Madison Bank & Trust v. First Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 276 Ark.
405, 409, 635 S.W.2d 268, 270-71 (1982); McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. 173, 175, 372 S.W.2d
220, 222 (1963); Easley v. Sky, Inc., 15 Ark. App. 64, 66, 689 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1985); Stub-
blefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
One reason for the double standard is courts' desire to prevent overreaching by employ-
ers. "Because post-employment restraints are often the product of unequal bargaining power
and may inflict unanticipated hardship on the employee," notes Professor Allan Farnsworth,
"they are scrutinized with more care than are covenants in the sale of a business." A. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 338. Cf Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (arguing that heightened scrutiny in certain types of constitu-
tional cases reflects judicial awareness that dominant groups sometimes give themselves "na-
ked preferences," i.e., benefits obtained through the exercise of raw political power).
The Restatement suggests another reason for according differential treatment: buyers of
business good will generally require protection from competition in order to enjoy the benefit
of their bargain, whereas employers usually can derive full value from their contracts without
such protection except in those instances where an employee might appropriate valuable trade
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a. Is the covenant's territorial scope broader than necessary to
achieve the legitimate objective the promisee supposedly seeks? In
other words, does the covenant forbid competition in an unnecessarily
large number of cities, counties, or states?
b. Is the covenant's temporal scope broader than necessary to
accomplish the legitimate goal the promisee claims to pursue? Put
another way, does the covenant bar competition for too many months
or years?
c. Is the covenant's substantive scope broader than necessary to
serve the legitimate purpose it ostensibly serves? That is to say, does
the covenant prohibit too many forms of competitive activity?
Every covenant is judged according to the facts and circum-
stances in that case. The party challenging the validity of a restraint
of competition has the burden of proving its unreasonableness. In
summary, the challenger must show the restraint lacks a legitimate
purpose or "lasts longer than is necessary to protect the promisee's
interest, covers a geographic area larger than is necessary to protect
those interests, or prohibits the promisor from engaging in activities
which are unnecessary to protect the promisee."' 0
III. ENDS SCRUTINY: LEGITIMATE PURPOSES
A. Restraint of Competition Ancillary to Sale of a Business'
The buyer of an established business or professional practice has
a legitimate interest in securing from the seller a promise not to com-
pete in a way that would devalue the good will and other assets the
buyer purchased. The covenant actually works to both parties' ad-
vantage because, in addition to protecting the buyer's investment, the
noncompetition clause enables the seller to exact a higher price for his
business. 12
information or customer relationships. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 com-
ment b (1981). See also Blake, supra note 6, at 647-48.
10. Easley v. Sky, Inc., 15 Ark. App. 64, 66-67, 689 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1985).
11. For an excellent discussion of the Arkansas law on this topic, see Note, Contracts-
Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to the Sale of a Business-Fifteen- Year Restraint Is
Reasonable. Hyde v. CM Vending, 288 Ark. 218, 703 S.W.2d 862 (1986), 9 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 531 (1986-87).
12. See Hyde v. CM Vending Co., 288 Ark. at 222, 703 S.W.2d at 864; Madison Bank &
Trust v. First Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 276 Ark. at 408-11, 635 S.W.2d at 270-72; McClure v.
Young, 193 Ark. 188, 190-91, 98 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1936); Wright v. Marshall, 182 Ark. 890,
891-92, 33 S.W.2d 43, 44 (1930); Hultsman v. Carroll, 177 Ark. 432, 434-37, 6 S.W.2d 551,
552-53 (1928); Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 643, 646, 297 S.W. 1027, 1029, 1030 (1927);
Culp Bros. Piano Co. v. Moore, 162 Ark. 292, 305-06, 258 S.W. 326, 330 (1924); Bledsoe v.
Carpenter, 160 Ark. 349, 352, 254 S.W. 677, 678 (1923); Wakenight v. Spear & Rogers, 147
[Vol. 12:57
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If the promisee already participates in the business or profession
and the promisor does not, however, the promisee lacks a proper pur-
pose for enforcing a prohibition against competition. Public policy
will not allow someone to buy off potential rivals in order to control a
market. Where the "avowed object of the contract was to stifle com-
petition and to promote a monopoly," rather than to protect the
promisee "in a legitimate use of something which it acquired by [the
contract]," an Arkansas court will not enforce the bargain.' 3 Nor will
a court enforce a covenant forbidding future competition between
parties who currently participate in the same market unless the prom-
ise effects a transfer of property or good will.' 4
B. Restraint of Competition Ancillary to an Employment
Relationship
1. Common Law of Contracts
The Arkansas Court of Appeals summarized the types of em-
ployment-related interests that qualify as legitimate bases for enforc-
ing covenants not to compete:
Where the covenant grows out of an employment or other associa-
tional relationship, the courts have found an interest sufficient to
warrant enforcement of the covenant only in those cases where the
covenantee provided special training, or made available trade
secrets, confidential business information or customer lists, and
then only if it is found that the associate was able to use informa-
tion so obtained to gain an unfair competitive advantage."
Arkansas cases are full of ad hoc judgments and hair-splitting distinc-
tions because the courts have tried to maintain a delicate state of equi-
librium among three competing interests: an employer's right to
protect his investment; an employee's right to work wherever and
with whomever he pleases; and a customer's right to do business with
the person of his choice. Nevertheless, from the numerous fact-de-
pendent Arkansas cases on noncompetition covenants in employment
contracts, we can distill a few basic principles.
First, an employer does not have a legitimate interest in prevent-
Ark. 342, 345-46, 227 S.W. 419, 420 (1921); Kimbro v. Wells, 112 Ark. 126, 129-30, 165 S.W.
645, 646 (1914); Hampton v. Caldwell, 95 Ark. 387, 388, 129 S.W. 816, 816 (1910); Bloom v.
Home Ins. Agency, 91 Ark. 367, 373-75, 121 S.W. 293, 295-96 (1909); Webster v. Williams, 62
Ark. 101, 105-07, 34 S.W. 537, 538 (1896).
13. Shapard v. Lesser, 127 Ark. 590, 594, 193 S.W. 262, 263 (1917). See also Wren v.
Pearah, 220 Ark. 888, 894, 249 S.W.2d 985, 988 (1952).
14. See Marshall v. Irby, 203 Ark. 795, 798-99, 158 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1942).
15. Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark. App. 137, 139-40, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1986).
1989-90]
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ing an ex-employee from using the general knowledge and experience
he acquired during his period of employment. 6
Second, an employer does have a legitimate interest in preventing
an ex-employee from making competitive use of secret formulas, tech-
niques, and devices which were developed at the employer's ex-
pense. 7  Secrecy is the essential element here: if the formulas,
methods, and so forth may be learned by consulting public sources, or
if the employer does not take adequate measures to avoid dissemina-
tion, the trade secrets rule is inapplicable. 8
Third, an employer has a legitimate interest in preventing an ex-
employee from unfairly exploiting confidential information. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court appears to define confidential information as
something which does not qualify as a trade secret, but which no com-
pany engaged in business for profit would disclose voluntarily to its
competitors. 19 Pricing data that reveal costs and profit margins, for
example, fit this definition."0 Information is not confidential if other
ex-employees may use it in the same manner as the defendant without
committing a breach of contract.2' Nor is it confidential if it is readily
ascertainable by anyone in the industry,22 or is available from a public
source such as a directory.2 3 The mere fact that an ex-employee
16. See McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. at 177, 372 S.W.2d at 223; see also American Excel-
sior Laundry Co. v. Derrisseaux, 204 Ark. 843, 845-46, 165 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1942) (absent
overriding justification, interference with ex-employee's right to continue working in chosen
field imposes undue hardship).
17. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185 (1947); Basso
Chemicals, Inc. v. Schmidt, 522 F. Supp. 1087, 1091-92 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (construing Florida
law, which the court deemed consistent with Arkansas law).
Besides relying on a covenant not to compete, an employer may protect his trade secrets
by invoking ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 607 (1987), the Arkansas version of the UNI-
FORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). The Act basically codifies much of the
common law of trade secrets. Id. at 538; Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332
N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983). For information on the common law of trade secrets, see
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
§ 2.03 (Business Organizations Vol. 12 (1986)).
18. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 751-52, 489 S.W.2d 1, 3
(1973); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 569
(1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984); Servomation Mathias, Inc.
v. Englert, 333 F. Supp. 9, 14-15 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion,
Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 901-03; UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. at 543 (discussing
common-law rule that failure to take reasonable steps to preserve secrecy or confidentiality of
information extinguishes protectible interest).
19. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. at 752, 489 S.W.2d at 3.
20. See All-State Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 252 Ark. 962, 964-65, 483 S.W.2d 210, 212
(1972).
21. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. at 752, 489 S.W.2d at 3.
22. See Borden, Inc. v. Smith, 252 Ark. 295, 299, 478 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (1972).
23. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. at 752, 489 S.W.2d at 3; Miller
[Vol. 12:57
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knows confidential information about the employer's customers does
not warrant enforcement of a noncompetition clause. The informa-
tion must help the ex-employee take advantage of personal relation-
ships with customers and thereby entice them away from the
employer.24
Fourth, an employer has a valid interest in thwarting unfair ap-
propriation of its stock of customers by an ex-employee. An employer
cannot prevent satisfied customers from seeking out the ex-employee
and giving him their patronage based solely upon their appreciation of
his skill.25 An employer does have a right, however, to stop an ex-
employee from soliciting business from customers on the strength of
the personal relationships which his employment enabled him to
develop.26
2. Common Law of Agency
Even if the contract says nothing about post-employment activ-
ity, the common law of agency imposes significant limitations on what
an ex-employee may do.2 7 An employee is a fiduciary whose duties do
not end upon termination of employment. He owes a fiduciary duty
not to use, to the detriment of his former employer, any secret or
v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 247 Ark. 565, 571, 446 S.W.2d 660, 663 (1969); McLeod v. Meyer, 237
Ark. at 176, 372 S.W.2d at 223; McCumber v. Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins.
Co., 230 Ark. 13, 17, 320 S.W.2d 637, 640 (1959).
24. See Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark. App. at 142, 718 S.W.2d at 114; Rebsamen Ins. v.
Milton, 269 Ark. 737, 742-44, 600 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Ark. App. 1980).
25. See Evans Laboratories, Inc. v. Melder, 262 Ark. 868, 871, 562 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1978);
Import Motors, Inc. v. Luker, 268 Ark. 1045, 1049-51, 599 S.W.2d 398, 400-01 (Ark. App.
1980).
26. See Borden, Inc. v. Huey, 261 Ark. 313, 316, 547 S.W.2d 760, 761 (1977); Hampton
Road, Inc. v. Miller, 18 Ark. App. 9, 12, 708 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1986); Girard v. Rebsamen Ins.
Co., 14 Ark. App. 154, 158, 685 S.W.2d 526, 528 (1985); Owens v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988); Olin Water Services v. Midland Research Laboratories,
Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 414 (E.D. Ark. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot, 774 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.
1985).
27. See generally Annotation, Former Employee's Duty, in Absence of Express Contract,
Not To Solicit Former Employer's Customers or Otherwise Use His Knowledge of Customer Lists
Acquired in Earlier Employment, 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY (1958) summarizes the common-law rule:
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the agent:
(a) has no duty not to compete with the principal;
(b) has a duty to the principal not to use or to disclose to third persons, on his
own account or on account of others, in competition with the principal or to his
injury, trade secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential matters
given to him only for the principal's use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty.
The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the method of business of
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:57
confidential 28 information he learned in the course of his employ-
ment. 29 The ex-employee may draw freely, however, upon knowledge
obtained through ordinary experience.3" A third party, such as a new
employer, who knowingly aids, encourages, or cooperates with the ex-
employee in the breach of his fiduciary duty not to use secret or confi-
dential information becomes liable, along with the ex-employee, for
any resulting harm.3'
IV. MEANS SCRUTINY: REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS
As noted above in Section II, courts identify the real purpose of a
covenant not to compete by examining the extent to which its territo-
rial, temporal, and substantive restrictions are necessary to achieve
the clause's ostensible aim. If the restrictions seem reasonably calcu-
lated to serve one of the legitimate purposes described in Section III,
the court enforces the prohibition, but if the restraints appear overly
broad, the court denies enforcement.
Courts sometimes say 'that each of the three means factors-ge-
the principal and the names of the customers retained in his memory, if not acquired
in violation of his duty as agent;
(c) has a duty to account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and
other confidential information, whether or not in competition with the principal;
(d) has a duty to the principal not to take advantage of a still subsisting confi-
dential relation created during the prior agency relation.
Id. § 396.
28. The duty not to use confidential information applies "regardless of the fact that the
information... might not technically be considered a trade secret." Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee
Forging Steel Service, Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 392 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying Arkansas law).
29. The Arkansas Supreme Court characterized this duty as being in the nature of an
implied provision of the employment contract. El Dorado Laundry Co. v. Ford, 174 Ark. 104,
106, 294 S.W. 393, 394 (1927). The plaintiff in El Dorado Laundry sued to enjoin its former
employee from soliciting business from customers whom the defendant had served while em-
ployed by the plaintiff. The court rejected the argument that the identities of the defendant's
own former customers constituted a trade secret. "[I1n the absence of an express contract,"
the court concluded, "on taking a new employment in a competing business an employee may
solicit for his new employer the business of his former customers, and will not be enjoined
from so doing at the instance of his former employer." Id. at 107, 294 S.W. at 394.
30. See Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc., 202 Ark. 470, 476, 151 S.W.2d 971, 974 (1941)
(ex-employee allowed to solicit former employer's customers because knowledge of customers
stemmed from experience rather than from secret or confidential information). But see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 comment b (1958) (although ex-employee may so-
licit former employer's customers if ex-employee retained customers' names in his memory, ex-
employee may not use written customer data made during employment); id. comment b (em-
ployee may not take job primarily for purpose of memorizing names for later use as competi-
tor); id. comment c (employee may not use information acquired by eavesdropping or by
unpermitted examination of employer's records).
31. See Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1180-82, 313 S.W.2d 802, 809-10 (1958); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 comment c (1958).
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ography, time, and substance-must be analyzed individually to de-
termine whether the covenant constitutes an unreasonable restraint of
trade.3 2 An examination of all the reported cases plainly shows, how-
ever, that Arkansas judges have recognized the subtle interplay of the
three variables. Each influences the others. For example, a five-
county restriction may withstand scrutiny if it bars competition in one
field of commercial activity for two years but will flunk the reasona-
bleness test if it bars competition in all fields for two years or in one
field for three years. In some cases, a particular factor may play the
predominant role, but the other two always lurk in the background
and provide a context for the dispositive issue.
The foregoing observations explain why it would be pointless to
compile separate lists of the various kinds of territorial, temporal, and
substantive restrictions which Arkansas courts either have enforced
or declined to enforce. Instead, we will examine the cases chronologi-
cally and see how the three factors, in combination with each other,
produced certain results.
A. Restraint of Competition Ancillary to Sale of a Business
1. Noncompetition Covenants Upheld by Courts
Courts have enforced the following types of anticompetition
clauses in contracts for the sale of a business or professional practice:
* A permanent prohibition against practicing medicine in
Texarkana and its immediate vicinity.3
3
* A ban on soliciting insurance business in Jefferson County
for five years.34
* A permanent prohibition against operating a barber shop
in Walnut Ridge.35
* A permanent ban on the establishment of a lumber yard in
Monticello. 6
* A permanent proscription of participating in the plumbing
business in Searcy (if such participation would compete with the
promisees).37
* A prohibition against engaging in the clothing business in
Arkadelphia for five years.3 8
32. See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. at 1035.
33. Webster v. Williams, 62 Ark. 101, 34 S.W. 537 (1896).
34. Bloom v. Home Ins. Agency, 91 Ark. 367, 121 S.W. 293 (1909).
35. Hampton v. Caldwell, 95 Ark. 387, 129 S.W. 816 (1910).
36. Kimbro v. Wells, 112 Ark. 126, 165 S.W. 645 (1914).
37. Wakenight v. Spear & Rogers, 147 Ark. 342, 227 S.W. 419 (1921).
38. Bledsoe v. Carpenter, 160 Ark. 349, 254 S.W. 677 (1923).
1989-901
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e A permanent ban on the sale of musical instruments in
Fort Smith, Hartford, Russellville, an Oklahoma town, and the
surrounding area.3 9
e A prohibition against competing with the promisee in the
ginning business in Kentucky Township, White County, for a pe-
riod of twenty years.4°
* A permanent restriction on the sale of gasoline at a partic-
ular location in Pulaski County.4'
* A permanent ban on reentering the restaurant business in
Blytheville.42
* A prohibition against engaging in the retail hardware or
furniture business in Walnut Ridge for three years.
4 3
0 A ban on the establishment of banking facilities in Hunts-
ville, Hindsville, Marble, or within a ten-mile radius of Huntsville
for ten years. 44
* A prohibition against operating a truck stop or service sta-
tion within a 100-mile radius of Alma (except for part of a certain
highway) for five years.45
* A ban on participating in the food and beverage vending
business within a fifty-mile radius of Russellville for a period of up
to fifteen years.46
2. Noncompetition Covenants Invalidated by Courts
The present study failed to discover a single reported case in
which an Arkansas appellate court declined to enforce a noncompeti-
tion clause in a contract for the sale of a business or professional prac-
tice on the ground that the covenant's territorial, temporal, or
substantive scope reached farther than necessary to protect the prom-
isee's legitimate interests. A United States district court decision,
Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc.,4 appears to be the
only reported example of invalidation based on a finding of
unreasonableness.
The contract at issue in Stubblefield barred the promisor from
39. Culp Bros. Piano Co. v. Moore, 162 Ark. 292, 258 S.W. 326 (1924).
40. Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927).
41. Hultsman v. Carroll, 177 Ark. 432, 6 S.W.2d 551 (1928).
42. Wright v. Marshall, 182 Ark. 890, 33 S.W.2d 43 (1930).
43. McClure v. Young, 193 Ark. 188, 98 S.W.2d 877 (1936).
44. Madison Bank & Trust v. First Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 276 Ark. 405, 635 S.W.2d
268 (1982).
45. Easley v. Sky, Inc., 15 Ark. App. 64, 689 S.W.2d 356 (1985).
46. Hyde v. CM Vending Co., 288 Ark. 218, 703 S.W.2d 862 (1986).
47. 590 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
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engaging in the newspaper business in Benton County for ten years.
Judge Franklin Waters noted that the covenant restricted employ-
ment as well as commercial opportunities, so he applied both height-
ened and minimal scrutiny and declared the restraint invalid under
each.4" The employment aspect of the case was not dispositive, how-
ever. "[E]ven if this contract was a pure business sale transaction, it
would be void because of the combined effect of the duration and geo-
graphic scope and the unreasonable restraint on trade which re-
sults."4 9 Stubblefield, therefore, stands for the proposition that,
although drafters of business noncompetition covenants enjoy great
latitude, courts will deny enforcement to grossly excessive
restrictions.
B. Restraint of Competition Ancillary to an Employment
Relationship
1. Noncompetition Covenants Upheld by Courts
Courts have deemed reasonable the following types of post em-
ployment limitations:
* A one-year prohibition against soliciting the promisee's
customers, disclosing its trade secrets, or working for a competi-
tor's pest control business within the territory where the promisee
had an established clientele (Little Rock, Ft. Smith, Clarksville,
Van Buren, Hot Springs, Dumas, Pine Bluff, Camp Robinson, and
a seventy-five mile radius of each city). The court emphasized the
brevity of the restriction and concluded that the covenant's territo-
rial scope corresponded closely enough to the interests it suppos-
edly served: protection of trade secrets, confidential customer
information, and the investment in special training.5"
* A ban on engaging in the linen supply business in Ft.
Smith or within twenty-five miles thereof for one year after termi-
nation of employment. The court stressed that the promisor still
could engage in the home laundry business, his previous occupa-
tion, and thus was not being deprived of the ability to make a liv-
ing. The court also emphasized the short duration of the restraint.
The opinion said little about the nexus between the covenant's ter-
ritorial coverage and its ostensible purpose, but evidently the court
considered the scope commensurate with the danger of customer
appropriation.5
48. Id. at 1036-37. On two-tiered scrutiny, see supra note 9.
49. 590 F. Supp. at 1037.
50. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185 (1947).
51. Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906 (1966).
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* A prohibition against the sale of school equipment and
supplies anywhere in Arkansas for two years after termination of
employment. The purpose of the covenant was to safeguard confi-
dential pricing information. The promisee operated statewide, so a
statewide ban on competition was reasonably necessary to protect
the promisee's legitimate interest. The two-year restriction also
bore a sufficiently close relationship to the covenant's objective,
the court held, because pricing information takes that long to be-
come obsolete.5
2
* A prohibition, lasting one year after termination of em-
ployment, against selling food in Conway, Morrilton, Clinton, and
Perryville. The purpose of the covenant was to prevent the ex-
employee, a traveling salesman, from using his personal relation-
ships with the promisee's customers to lure them away from his
former employer. The territorial scope of the covenant reflected
that purpose by restricting competition only in the county seats of
counties in which the promisor sold the promisee's products dur-
ing the last two years of their employment relationship. The court
found the territorial restriction reasonable and reached the same
conclusion regarding the covenant's duration because the evidence
showed the danger of customer appropriation remained high for at
least a year after the promisor left.53
* A covenant barring the sale of water treatment products,
for a period of one year after termination of employment, to any of
the promisee's established prospects or customers in the ex-em-
ployee's assigned sales territory. Here, too, the covenant aimed to
prevent unfair exploitation of personal relationships. The territo-
rial scope of the covenant passed the reasonableness test because
the restriction did not prevent the ex-employee from doing busi-
ness with everyone in Arkansas, but only with particular buyers
and prospective buyers (those the promisor was most likely to ap-
propriate unfairly). This approach, the court underscored, left the
ex-employee free to solicit purchases from a huge pool of people
throughout Arkansas. The court devoted scant attention to the
temporal scope of the covenant, apparently considering a one-year
period reasonable per se.54
0 A covenant preventing the ex-employee from soliciting or
accepting insurance business from his own former customers for a
two-year period following termination of his employment. The
covenant provided a reasonable means of preventing unfair appro-
52. All-State Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 252 Ark. 962, 483 S.W.2d 210 (1972).
53. Borden, Inc. v. Huey, 261 Ark. 313, 547 S.W.2d 760 (1977).
54. Olin Water Services v. Midland Research Laboratories, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412 (E.D.
Ark. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot, 774 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985).
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priation of customers, the court held, because its substantive scope
was not too broad. The provision did not apply to all forms of
business, but only to insurance business. The territorial scope
presented no obstacle to enforcement because the covenant allowed
the ex-employee to continue working in the same town. He could
sell insurance to anyone he pleased so long as he had not served the
buyer while employed by the promisee. The two-year period quali-
fied as reasonable, the court concluded, because the task of training
a replacement for the ex-employee would take that long.
55
0 A covenant reducing an insurance agent's postemploy-
ment compensation if, within two years after termination, he man-
aged a competing business located within 200 miles of the Little
Rock office he managed for the promisee. The object of the cove-
nant was to prevent the ex-agent from using confidential informa-
tion to entice the promisee's customers. The court did not clearly
articulate why it found the two-year and 200-mile provisions rea-
sonable. The opinion suggests, however, that the reasonableness
test will be applied less stringently if the covenant merely exacts a
financial penalty instead of prohibiting competition outright.5 6
2. Noncompetition Covenants Invalidated by Courts
The following noncompetition provisions in employment con-
tracts were held unreasonable because their territorial, temporal, or
substantive scope proved broader than necessary to achieve a legiti-
mate objective:
e A covenant barring a laundry route man from engaging in
the laundry or dry cleaning business in the Pine Bluff area for five
years after termination of his employment with the promisee. The
purpose of the covenant was to prevent unfair solicitation of the
employer's stock of customers. The employer could have attained
that objective by means of a restriction shorter than five years, so
the court invalidated the covenant on the ground that it unduly
restricted the ex-employee's right to earn a living in his calling.5 7
* A prohibition against working for a brush clearing busi-
ness in Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, or Arkansas for five years
after ending employment with the promisee. The aim of the cove-
nant appeared to be preservation of the employer's stock of cus-
tomers rather than protection of trade secrets or confidential
55. Girard v. Rebsamen Ins. Co., 14 Ark. App. 154, 685 S.W.2d 526 (1985).
56. Owens v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1988).
57. American Excelsior Laundry Co. v. Derrisseaux, 204 Ark. 843, 165 S.W.2d 598
(1942); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 457, 206 S.W.2d 185, 189
(1947) (explaining and distinguishing American Excelsior).
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information. The restriction did not need to embrace so much ter-
ritory and last so long to serve that purpose, hence the court held
the covenant unreasonable.5"
* A covenant restraining a linen service company executive
from working for another linen service or laundry company any-
where in the promisee's sales area (most of Arkansas) for five years
after the end of his employment by the promisee. The court con-
cluded that the covenant provided the employer with greater pro-
tection than the company required and imposed an undue hardship
on the ex-employee. The substantive scope of the covenant was
unreasonable, the court held, because it included a type of busi-
ness-family laundry service-in which the promisee had never
engaged. Moreover, the five-year restriction was too long. The
linen service business did not involve trade secrets, so the em-
ployer's only legitimate interest seemed to be the preservation of its
stock of customers. For that purpose, a shorter period would have
sufficed.59
* A covenant preventing a commercial pilot from rendering
crop dusting services within a fifty-mile radius of Eudora for five
years after terminating his employment with the promisee. The
court declared the restriction invalid because of its length (indicat-
ing that a five-year restraint is unreasonable per se), but suggested
in dicta that a two-year period probably would have survived
scrutiny.6°
* A three-year postemployment prohibition against compet-
ing with the promisee in the sale or development of real estate
within a fifty-mile radius of Greers Ferry Lake. The court consid-
ered the territorial scope overly broad but failed to explain the pre-
cise basis for that conclusion. 6' The court's discussion of the
three-year duration of the covenant made more sense. Evidently,
the purpose of the covenant was to prevent ex-employees from
making unfair use of customer information. A three-year restric-
tion was longer than necessary, the court held, because customer
information became useless after only a few months.62
58. McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. 173, 372 S.W.2d 220 (1963).
59. Little Rock Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Independent Linen Service Co. of Ark., 237
Ark. 877, 377 S.W.2d 34 (1964).
60. Brown v. Devine, 240 Ark. 838, 402 S.W.2d 669 (1966).
61. Miller v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 247 Ark. 565, 570-71, 446 S.W.2d 660, 663 (1969). The
court merely noted the absence of trade secrets and contrasted this case with McCumber v.
Federated Mutual Implement & Hdw. Ins. Co., 230 Ark. 13, 320 S.W.2d 637 (1959), in which
the court declined to enforce a covenant with a narrower territorial scope than the Greers
Ferry area restriction. McCumber was inapposite, though, because the result there turned on
the absence of a legitimate purpose for the covenant rather than on the breadth of the restric-
tion. See id. at 17, 320 S.W.2d at 640, and text accompanying note 23 supra.
62. Miller v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 247 Ark. at 571-72, 446 S.W.2d at 664.
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* A covenant restricting the ex-employee, for a period of one
year, from competing with the promisee in the food-selling busi-
ness within the promisee's trade area, which included almost four-
fifths of Arkansas. The court did not examine the reasonableness
of the covenant's temporal scope because it found the territorial
coverage much broader than necessary to forestall the unfair ex-
ploitation of personal relationships with customers. The ex-em-
ployee had serviced customers in only four of the fifty-nine
Arkansas counties covered by the covenant, so the fit between
means and end was too attenuated to merit enforcement.63
9 A ban on selling real estate in Pulaski County for three
years after termination of employment with the promisee. The
purpose of the covenant was to prevent the ex-employee from using
confidential information unfairly, but since the useful life of the
information was far less than three years, the court found the cove-
nant's duration unreasonable."
* A prohibition against engaging in the insurance business
within a seventy-five mile radius of El Dorado for five years after
ending employment with the promisee. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial judge's conclusion that the five-year restriction was
unreasonable, but the sketchy appellate opinion sheds little light on
the court's reasoning.65
* A covenant barring a chemist from working for another
manufacturer of defoaming agents anywhere in the United States
for two years after leaving the promisee. The court declined to
enforce the contract as written because the restriction applied to
parts of the nation where the covenantee had few, if any,
customers.66
e A prohibition against engaging in the newspaper business
in Benton County for ten years. The purpose of the covenant was
to protect customer lists and other confidential information. The
court surveyed the case law and concluded that a restriction in an
employment contract exceeding two years is presumptively invalid;
therefore, a ten-year restraint seemed plainly unreasonable. Fur-
thermore, the geographic scope swept too broadly because the con-
tract prevented the promisor from becoming associated with any
publication-even an out-of-state journal-that did business in
Benton County, thus giving the restriction virtually nationwide
effect. 67
63. Borden, Inc. v. Smith, 252 Ark. 295, 478 S.W.2d 744 (1972).
64. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1 (1973).
65. United Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Martin, 258 Ark. 916, 529 S.W.2d 871 (1975).
66. Basso Chemicals, Inc. v. Schmidt, 522 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
67. Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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V. CONCLUSION
A lawyer must use great care in drafting a covenant not to com-
pete because an Arkansas court will not apply a blue pencil to overly
broad provisions. The court either will enforce a covenant exactly as
written or invalidate it altogether.68 Consequently, the drafter should
be extremely conservative and include only those restrictions that the
client actually needs to protect judicially recognized interests. Here
are a few suggested guidelines for writing an enforceable covenant:
1. Spell out the exact purpose of the noncompetition clause. If
the aim of the clause is to prevent an ex-employee from unfairly ex-
ploiting his knowledge of trade secrets or his relationships with cus-
tomers, say so explicitly. By eschewing boilerplate and focusing upon
the specific dangers facing your client, you will reduce the risk that a
court will view the covenant as simply an attempt to monopolize.
2. Make sure the covenant's territorial scope corresponds
closely to the danger the covenant aims to obviate. If the danger is
customer pirating, for example, the logical ambit of the restricted
zone is the area where the customers live or work. Better still, instead
of putting an area off limits, put the customers themselves off limits.
In other words, rather than prohibiting the employee of a Pulaski
County-based company from competing in Pulaski County, where
most of the company's customers reside, bar the employee from con-
tacting any customer whom the employee personally served, regard-
less of where the customer lives. Framing the restriction in
nonterritorial terms should refute a challenger's argument that the
covenant tries to carve out an exclusive trading zone. The employee
will remain free to work anywhere he wishes, and he may deal with
anyone he pleases, except for that tiny fraction of the population con-
sisting of former customers.69
68. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. at 753, 489 S.W.2d at 4; Borden,
Inc. v. Smith, 252 Ark. at 299-300, 478 S.W.2d at 747; Brown v. Devine, 240 Ark. at 842, 402
S.W.2d at 672; McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. at 178, 372 S.W.2d at 223; Hampton Road, Inc. v.
Miller, 18 Ark. App. at 11, 708 S.W.2d at 99-100.
69. In some situations, however, the drafter will have to use a territorial restriction. Take
the sale of business good will, for instance. The buyer of a going concern pays for a reputation
which the buyer hopes will attract new customers as well as retain the business's existing
clientele. A covenant that merely prohibits the seller from contacting those who actually
traded with him before the sale would deny the buyer the benefit of his bargain. Such a cove-
nant would be unfair to the buyer because it would allow the seller to continue to exploit an
asset for which the buyer had paid valuable consideration: the seller's reputation in the area
among people who had heard of the seller but had not yet traded with him. The only way to
secure the buyer's bargain would be to ban the seller from trading with anyone in the region
for a reasonable period of time. The restricted area should be narrowly defined, however, to
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3. Base the length of the noncompetition term on the nature of
the promisee's business, and ensure that the restriction lasts no longer
than absolutely necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate inter-
ests. If the purpose of the noncompetition clause is to protect a secur-
ities dealer's customer information, say, and if industry conditions
give the material a useful life of only six months, limit the noncompe-
tition clause's duration to six months. Arkansas courts have enforced
sale-of-business covenants lasting fifteen years and longer, but they
have taken a much tougher stance on employment covenants. As
Judge Waters observed in Stubblefield, "[a]lthough the reasonableness
of a covenant not to compete must be determined in light of the par-
ticular facts of each case, . . .[Arkansas decisions] strongly indicate
that covenants contained in employment contracts which restrict
competition for more than two years are highly suspect and are gener-
ally void as against public policy." 7 The prudent drafter will not
crowd the two-year limit, but will confine the covenant's temporal
scope to a year or less.
4. Do not proscribe any forms of conduct except those that di-
rectly threaten your client's interests. If your client sells trucks, you
may restrict employees from working for a competing truck dealer,
but do not try to prevent them from earning their living selling cars.
Similarly, if you represent the buyer of a dry-cleaning business, you
may include in the contract of sale a provision preventing the seller
from resuming the cleaning business in that area for a reasonable pe-
riod of time, but you may not abridge his right to open a laundromat.
A covenant that reaches farther than necessary invites the inference
that the promisee inserted the restriction, not for the purpose of pro-
tecting legitimate interests, but in order to punish the promisor.
Given courts' traditional distaste for contracts impeding free trade in
labor and goods, salutary self-restraint should guide the drafter's pen.
include only the territory where the seller had done business and built a reputation prior to the
sale.
Protection of trade secrets also necessitates the use of a territorial limitation. An em-
ployee who is entrusted with trade secrets or other confidential information should be prohib-
ited from working for anyone who could exploit the material to the promisee's detriment.
That would include all competitors doing business in the area where the promisee operates.
The area should be defined as precisely as possible.
70. Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. at 1035.
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